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Who Gets the Deposit when Trustees for a Bankrupt Buyer Disclaim a Real Estate Contract? 
The decision of Henry J in Majet v Goggin and Miller (as joint and several trustees of bankrupt estate 
of Brett-Hall) [2015] QSC 38 dealt with the fate of a deposit that was paid under a real estate 
contract that did not complete in unusual circumstances. 
Facts 
On 15 January 2014, the sellers entered a contract to sell residential property to Mr Brett-Hall, as the 
buyer, for $1,390,000.  Mr Brett-Hall paid a deposit of $139,000 into the trust account of the 
solicitor for the sellers at the time.  The contract provided for settlement to occur on or before 150 
days of the contract date, being 14 June 2014.  Unfortunately, Mr Brett-Hall was declared bankrupt 
on 14 March 2014 and a sequestration order was made against his estate.  The sequestration order 
of 14 March 2014 noted the date of the act of bankruptcy was 6 December 2013, being the deemed 
commencement of the bankruptcy. 
On 29 April 2014, one of the trustees of the bankrupt estate disclaimed the contract as unprofitable 
by notice to the sellers of disclaimer of onerous property under s 133(1A) of the Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth).  The disclaimer said: 
I confirm that I have deemed the above contract is an unprofitable contract on the basis that it 
imposes on the bankrupt estate financial obligations which I regard as detrimental to the creditors of 
the estate.  The said obligations are in the nature of legal costs, stamp duty costs and the balance of 
the purchase price.  
As mentioned, this litigation dealt with the fate of the deposit. 
For the trustees of the bankrupt estate, it was argued that, as the date of the act of bankruptcy (6 
December 2013) was prior to formation of the contract on 15 January 2014, any property of Mr 
Brett-Hall held or received after 6 December 2013 was held in trust for the trustees for the benefit of 
the creditors of the estate.  In making this assertion the trustees placed reliance upon s 115(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).   
For the sellers, it was argued that the trustees’ disclaimer of the contract constituted an anticipatory 
breach or repudiation of the contract entitling the sellers to terminate the contract and forfeit the 
deposit.  In making this argument, the sellers relied on a standard contractual provision to the effect 
that the Seller is entitled to the deposit where a contract is terminated owing to the Buyer’s default. 
Decision 
As noted by Henry J, the issue for determination was the impact of the bankruptcy trustee’s 
disclaimer upon the rights, interests and liabilities of the parties to the contract.  Of pivotal 
importance was whether or not the trustee’s disclaimer had the consequence that the buyer was in 
default such that the sellers should be held entitled to the deposit.  In this regard, Henry J was 
required to determine the effect of s 133(2) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).  Section 133(2) 
provides: 
A disclaimer under subsection (1) or (1A) operates to determine forthwith the rights, interests and 
liabilities of the bankrupt and his or her property in or in respect of the property disclaimed, and 
discharges the trustee from all personal liability in respect of the property disclaimed as from the date 
when the property vested in him or her, but does not, except so far as is necessary for the purpose of 
releasing the bankrupt and his or her property and the trustee from liability, affect the rights or 
liabilities of any other person. (italics added) 
Henry J noted that s 133(2) does not on its terms terminate the contract.  While the disclaimer 
ended the buyer’s rights, interests and liabilities in respect of the contract it did not determine the 
sellers’ rights under the contract.  To the extent that the proviso to s 133(2) provides ‘does not … 
affect the rights or liabilities of any other person’ (‘the proviso’), the sellers’ contractual rights 
remained extant.   
For the trustees it was argued that the disclaimer forthwith ended their liability to perform the 
contract.  They submitted that the notice of disclaimer could not logically result in the buyer being in 
default of the buyer’s liability to perform the contract when its statutory effect was to remove that 
liability.  However, Henry J was not prepared to accept that the effect of the disclaimer transcended 
all consequences of the disclaimed contract.  Henry J opined (at [29]): 
Pursuant to s 133(2) the disclaimer only determined the rights, interests and liabilities of the bankrupt 
buyers and his property in respect of the contract.  The disclaimer did not determine the sellers’ rights 
or liabilities under the contract.  They are preserved by the proviso.  In the present context their 
continued existence is inconsistent with 133(2) having the meaning that what was contractually 
required to occur must be entirely ignored because of the disclaimer.  That the buyer was discharged 
from personal liability for the consequences of not proceeding did not render the factual 
consequences of the act of disclaimer irrelevant so far as the sellers’ rights were concerned. 
As the trustee’s disclaimer manifested an unwillingness to perform the contract it was prima facie a 
repudiation of the contract by anticipatory breach.  There was nothing in s 133(2) that removed the 
sellers’ right to terminate because of the default constituted by that anticipatory breach.  On this 
basis, the sellers were prima facie entitled to the deposit pursuant to the standard contractual 
clauses. 
That left one final matter for determination being the impact (if any) of the exception within s 
133(2).  As noted by Henry J, the effect of the exception is that a disclaimer will affect the rights and 
liabilities of any person ‘so far as is necessary for the purpose of releasing the bankrupt and his or 
her property and the trustee from liability’ (‘the exception’).  As the exception operates to release 
from liability, Henry J did not consider the exception to be of any relevance to the deposit as 
property.  Any ‘liability’ of the buyer in respect of the deposit was met when the deposit was paid 
pursuant to the contract.  Once the deposit was in the hands of the stakeholder it was not subject to 
liability but rather to rights, namely the contractual entitlement of either the sellers or the buyer to 
receive the deposit as provided for in the contract.  Further, the exception was not considered to be 
relevant to the liability of the bankrupt buyer or his trustees to complete the contract.  It was not 
considered necessary to deprive the sellers of their entitlement to the deposit in order to release the 
buyer or his trustees from their liability to complete. 
Given these conclusions, Henry J made a declaration as to the Sellers’ entitlement to the deposit.   
Comment 
Although the fact situation encountered in this instance was unusual, the result demonstrates the 
limits of the ability of a trustee in bankruptcy to disclaim an unprofitable contract.  On the basis of 
this result, although such a disclaimer will be effective to relieve a trustee of future contractual 
liability it will not, as regards the recovery of a deposit, have the effect of putting the trustee in a 
better position than an ordinary buyer who is unable to complete a contract in accordance with its 
terms. 
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